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ABSTRACT
Mobile Networks (MNs) are fundamental infrastructures in modern life. As
traffic volumes rise and subscriber needs are expanding, MNOs need to adapt
in order to keep up with the demand. This has led to Mobile Network Op-
erators (MNOs) virtualising the Core Network (CN) by utilising Software
Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV).
The security and reliability of the MN are under higher levels of scrutiny
as more traffic and subscribers make use of the MN. As MNs become more
popular so do they become more enticing for malicious actors as targets for
attacks. The virtualisation of the CN has led to new security issues being
introduced such as unused network paths being created for attackers to ex-
ploit. This research aims to utilise SDN and NFV to mitigate this issue by
only allowing for critical network paths to be traversable in a virtualised CN
without triggering alerts and node quarantines.
The CN of a MN controls/manages all network traffic flows through the
mobile network from User Equipment (UE) to a backhaul network (e.g., the
Internet). Flows are streams of data that make use of a network path between
two or more nodes within a network. Security has mostly been focussed on
defending the perimeter of the CN to prevent unwanted access to the in-
ternals of the CN, as well as preventing the UE of subscribers from getting
compromised.
This perimeter only focus has led to the High Value Assets (HVAs) of
the CN being vulnerable to attacks from malicious actors that have gained
access to the internal nodes of a CN. Vulnerabilities still exist in the system
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that could allow for the attacker to compromise a node within the CN. If
an attacker were to gain access to a node within the CN then they would
be able to manoeuvre throughout the network undetected and unhindered
along any and every network path with an HVA being their most likely goal.
Therefore a Network Intruder Prevention System (NIPS) is proposed that
will limit the paths that are allowed within the CN and detects whenever an
attempt is made to traverse a non critical network path. This will greatly
increase the probability of an attacker being detected.
The NIPS will leverage off of two new network architectures in order to
protect the CN’s HVAs. First SDN is leveraged to gain a holistic view of
network traffic flows within the CN. SDN allows for network control func-
tions to integrate with a logically centralised controller. The controller also
allows for programmatic management of the network which proves to be cru-
cial in detecting, containing and responding to security threats internal to a
network. Second is NFV which allows for specific network functions within
the CN to be virtualised. With the ability to virtualise the specific nodes
within the CN comes the chance to programmatically deploy network func-
tions with the specific goal of security once an anomaly is detected within
the network. NFV is selected for this research due to its ability to quickly
deploy false instances of the target of a network attack, therefore allowing
for comprehensive containment. SDN and NFV create a better environment
in which attackers attempting to target a HVA can be mitigated.
A SDN based NIPS is proposed that applies strict control rules to the
network traffic flows allowed between nodes in the CN. During normal func-
tionality of the CN, only flows that make use of critical network paths are
required. If a flow is requested from the SDN controller that is determined
to be malicious, then the SDN application is designed to automatically de-
ploy a virtualised decoy version of the intended target, by means of NFV.
The controller is then able to redirect malicious flows away from their in-
tended target towards the decoy, effectively quarantining the compromised
node therefore mitigating the attacks damage. The NIPS was tested on a
v
Containernet testbed. It is shown that a NIPS with the described function-
ality would detect, contain and respond to the attackers attempting lateral
movement.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Mobile access to the Internet is becoming a fundamental need in modern life;
mobile devices have outnumbered human population for the last few years
[1–3]. Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) have been challenged to keep up
with the rate of growth of mobile traffic, while still attempting to remain prof-
itable. The end users’ constant expectation for lower data costs, while still
expecting improvements in data transfer rates as well as Quality of Service
(QoS), has led to the need to lower the cost per bit for the users. In order to
achieve this MNOs are now making use of new paradigms in order get higher
levels of throughput from their networks, which has led to the Mobile Net-
work (MN) being a more enticing target for malicious actors. The inclusion
of the new paradigms also brings the opportunity to leverage off their func-
tionalities to improve the overall security of the MN. These paradigms allow
for attacks against the MN to be mitigated in a proactive and automated way.
Creating secure mobile networks has been a goal since its inception and
security concerns have significantly influenced its design. Focus has been on
ensuring that the mobile network is protected from threats by malicious end
users or attackers. Threats to the mobile network can be classified into the
following categories [4]:
1. Rendering a system unreliable or unusable.
2. Performing unauthorised manipulation of information.
1
3. Obtaining unauthorised access to information
4. Theft of service.
5. Losing control of the network or node within the network
Current mobile networks are comprised of a Radio Access Network (RAN)
and a Core Network (CN). End users access the mobile network via the RAN.
The CN is then responsible for processing and administrating over the user’s
service (e.g. ensuring QoS and monitoring network usage for accounting pur-
poses) as well as connecting to backhaul networks such as the Internet. The
CN is also referred to as the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) and these terms
will be used interchangeably. The EPC is the CN of the fourth generation of
mobile networks (4G).
Research focus has been on preventing an attacker from gaining access
to the EPC by defending the perimeter nodes, essentially trusting all inter-
nal entities within the EPC. This trusting network is shown in Figure 1.1
where all entities can communicate with one another. The ”perimeter only”
approach and trust level has been demonstrated not to be effective for a va-
riety of reasons [5]. Methods/vulnerabilities still exist that could allow the
attacker to find themselves with administrative level access to a node in the
EPC. Examples of such methods can be found in List 1.1
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of EPC configuration differentiating between critical
and non critical paths
List 1.1: Examples of Network Vulnerabilities
• Social engineering techniques to obtain an MNO employee’s credentials
(i.e. phishing).
• Configuration error on a node or the services running on a node, leading
to the ability for Remote Code Execution (RCE).
• Malware being loaded onto the node via a patch or update of a com-
promised third party application via a supply chain attack [6, 7].
• Insecure code being deployed onto a node.
• Attacks using vulnerabilities and exploits not predicted by the creators
of the security procedures.
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Attackers are considered to be any actor that is targeting the EPC with
malicious intent. Attackers can range from individual actors all the way
up to a nation state organisation that specializes in Advanced Persistent
Threats (APT) against information systems such as a MN. This research
covers attackers that are considered to be any actor that is able to exploit
vulnerabilities in computer systems to take control of an entity in the EPC.
The attackers aim to garner more control or information from the EPC by
laterally moving to other nodes within the network.
If an attacker were to gain access to a node in the EPC, all perimeter
protection mechanisms, such as firewalls, would not be effective at warning
the MNO that an attacker has successfully infiltrated their EPC. Once an
attacker has established a base inside the network, the next step would be
for the attacker to perform reconnaissance on the network to locate High
Value Assets (HVA) or other vulnerable nodes in the network [8]. An exam-
ple of such attack on an HVA presented in this research is for an attacker
to target the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) which is the main database of
the EPC in order to exfiltrate all the information that it contains. Other
HVAs in the EPC contain all users data or could be used to perform a Man
In The Middle (MITM) attack on all traffic through the mobile network. It
is evident that the current EPC design requires security systems put in place
that can protect it from attacks originating from other nodes within the EPC.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the network pathways that are open within the mo-
bile EPC for an attacker to use in order to laterally move throughout the
network. The large amount of non critical network paths between nodes
within the EPC only gets exponentially larger as more nodes are added to
the EPC. Non critical network paths are paths between nodes that never
need to communicate with one another. In a typically functioning CN, non
critical paths should never get used. The attacker on a compromised node
within the EPC would be able to make use of any of the paths to get access
to another entity within the network thereby ensuring that their attack can
be persistent as the attacker has many points of control. These paths would
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be considered open as each of the nodes in the EPC are connected to the
same Local Area Network (LAN) segment, which is required for the critical
paths to be available.
Figure 1.1 also shows the compromised node as an administrative node
on the EPC, these nodes are included in the EPC in order for MNO technical
staff to gain access to the EPC so that they can perform administrative tasks
or reconfigure the EPC. The admin nodes (also known as jump boxes) are
the nodes most likely to get compromised because they experience the most
human interaction which can lead to human error and the possible introduc-
tion of vulnerabilities [9, 10]. These nodes would also be the entry point for
attackers that have been successful in phishing for credentials.
Data flows between network entities make use of the network paths be-
tween the entities and are the flows that are referred to throughout this work.
Any communication between network entities requires a flow of data between
the two network entities along a network path. For the rest of this research,
a malicious flow can be defined as any flow that make use of a non critical
path because these paths would never get utilised during normal operations
of the EPC, therefore data traversing these non critical paths must be seen
as suspicious.
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) such as Snort [11] and Sur-
ricata [12] have been designed to detect suspicious reconnaissance behaviours
such as network mapping to gain information on the IP addresses and config-
uration of nodes in the network. Current IDS lack the ability to distinguish
between flows that make use of critical or non critical paths within a net-
work. So if an attacker already knows the IP address of an HVA, current
IDS systems would not get triggered by what would seem to be a legitimate
lateral movement from a compromised node to an HVA. This is due to the
fact that if two nodes exist in the same LAN segment with open ports, then
the nodes would be able to communicate with one another. Figure 1.2 illus-
trates a compromised node on the network attempting to access the HSS on
5
Figure 1.2: Attacker successfully achieving a malicious flow to an HVA of
the mobile core network
the EPC. This network path (red path) allows for a flow that is not critical
to the functionality of the network so this flow should be seen as suspicious/-
malicious.
The ability to distinguish between critical and non-critical paths requires
a network wide, high level of abstraction and management in order to strictly
define which flows are critical to the functionality of the EPC. Software De-
fined Networking (SDN) has been proposed to provide a high level abstrac-
tion, view and control over networks. In a network that makes use of the
SDN paradigm, a logically centralized controller would be able to distinguish
between malicious and critical flows within the EPC.
SDN requires the switches that connect the EPC elements together to
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be enabled with a specific protocol that allows communications between the
switches and a central controller, such as OpenFlow [13]. With SDN imple-
mented in a network, the switches become simpler devices that only forward
traffic based on a flow table that gets populated by the logically centralised
controller [14]. When a new flow is requested of a switch that is not already
in the switch’s flow table, the switch then reaches out to the controller, via
the OpenFlow protocol, with the request of how to process this new flow.
Network applications, making use of the abstraction provided by the con-
troller, could be configured to detect whenever a non-critical path is being
traversed within the network because a malicious flow along that path would
need to get requested from the controller. This can be done by creating a
white list of critical paths, the application would check the path of the flow
request against the white list and if it is not in the white list then that flow
request can be determined to be suspicious/malicious because it is not mak-
ing use of a network path that is critical to the functionality of the EPC.
The logical flow of the system is presented in Figure 1.3 and will be dis-
cussed from the bottom up. Firstly one of the OpenFlow enabled switches
receives a data flow request that it can not process as it does not currently
have that flow rule inside its flow table. The switch therefore reaches out to
the controller with the flow request. The controller is configured to pass all
flow requests onto the NIPS application. The NIPS checks the flow request’s
path against the white list of critical paths that were preconfigured. The
NIPS would then be able to tell the difference between legitimate or suspi-
cious flows within the EPC.
In addition to the ability of the SDN controller to distinguish malicious
flows from critical ones, comes the ability to quarantine an infected node
once it has been determined to be performing suspicious activities. The flow
requests from the suspicious node could be rerouted to a decoy such that
more information could be gathered on the attacker while not alerting the
attacker. This information could be used by MNOs to create other systems
that analyse inputs for patterns similar to the attackers.
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Figure 1.3: Simplified logical data flow between EPC entities, OpenFlow
enabled switches, controller and the NIPS application
Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) allows for virtual network func-
tions to be programmatically deployable. These VNF’s are the perfect candi-
date to be used as decoys as each of the entities inside the EPC have already
been virtualised by previous research [15]. Only once an attack has been
detected by the Network application, will the decoy need to get deployed.
This ability for decoy VNFs to get programmatically deployed only when
necessary will be a great benefit for MNOs as opposed to the alternative
that involves permanently running a physical decoy machine.
In this thesis SDN and NFV are shown to be effective at defending the
EPC from attackers internal to the EPC by automatically detecting flows
that make use of non critical paths within the EPC. These flows would be
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detected as malicious, as there would be no other reason for them to get
requested from the controller. Once a malicious flow is detected, the threat
would autonomously get contained by leveraging the controller’s ability to
redirect flows. The flows from the compromised node would get redirected to
a decoy version of its initial target, which is deployed programmatically by
NFV techniques only once it is required. The system would also be capable
of asynchronously alerting the MNO operatives about the attack so that they
can respond accordingly while at the same time containing the attack.
1.1 Research Motivation
MNOs face a crisis of trust with their users [16]. Securing users’ information
as well as ensuring the continued functionality of their networks remains a
high priority. MNOs are constantly trying to get better performance from
their networks in order to entice more customers even though it is known
that as the use of a network increases, so too does the probability of being
targeted by malicious actors. The opportunity is available to leverage off
new technologies, such as SDN and NFV, in order to apply new methods of
securing the mobile core networks.
The main aim of SDN is to enable logically centralized control for the
network by means of abstractions such as, allowing for a global network view
and introducing a programmatic interface to the network switches. This al-
lows for software defined rules to be put in place on a network in terms of
flows between entities within the EPC.
One of the concerns with the EPC’s security is that the basic entities
required for the EPC to function are not secured against attackers that have
infiltrated the same network that the entities reside on. Current IDSs are
limited by the fact that they can not distinguish between flows that make
use of critical and non critical paths within a network. So if attackers have
achieved knowledge of the network layout without being detected (eg. in-
sider information, or finding IP addresses of other nodes in configuration files
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or logs) then they would be able to laterally traverse through the network
directly to other nodes.
In order to defend the EPC from internal attacks while not limiting its
functionality, performance and the Quality of Service (QoS) offered to sub-
scribers, strict control needs to be asserted over flows within the network. By
utilising the global network view of the controller, paths between entities in
the network that are critical to its functionality can be white listed such that
network traffic flows are limited to those paths. If a switch requests a flow
rule from the controller that makes use of a path that is not in the white list of
critical paths then that flow can be marked as conspicuous and actions can be
taken to mitigate the possible threat. The controller compares the source and
destination of the request in order to determine what path is being traversed.
In non SDN enabled networks, the only response once a threat has been
detected would be to drop the connections [17]. With SDN, network control-
ling applications are then able to automatically react to the alerts. MNOs
would like to gather information on an attacker once they are detected in
order to be able to best deal with the situation. It would also be preferential
for the attacker to not realise that their actions have alerted the MNO of
their presence so that more information can be gathered.
A decoy is designed to appear as a fully functioning network node but
actually functions to obtain information on those that connect to it and con-
vince the attacker that they are interacting with a legitimate node on the
network. A controller is capable of altering any flow in the network by alter-
ing which network path the data flows along, therefore a compromised node
can be contained by redirecting all network traffic flows attempting to make
use of a non critical path to an HVA, directly to a decoy version of the HVA.
Figure 1.4 shows how this could be achieved, first the compromised node
(red) makes an attempt to communicate with an HVA, that generates a ma-
licious (red) flow which is requested from the controller. The controller and
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Figure 1.4: Malicious flow being redirected to a decoy version of its intended
target
network applications are able to determine that the flow is not making use
of a path in the white list of critical paths. This then triggers the controller
to redirect flows originating from the compromised node to a decoy version
of the intended target (green flow and node). The attacker would not be
alerted that they have been detected as the decoy version would appear to
them as the legitimate target, therefore ensuring the MNO operatives have
time to react to the infiltration without the attacker causing any harm to
the network or exfiltrating any valuable data. The HVA node would remain
functioning as expected throughout this process.
MNOs would not like to waste their resources on having a decoy for each
of their HVAs running at all times in case of an attack. Network Function
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Virtualisation (NFV) allows for network functions of the EPC to be deployed
as Virtual Network Functions (VNFs). Therefore by utilising NFV, the spe-
cific decoy of the attacker’s intended target could be deployed only once it
is necessary. The decoy would get deployed with dummy data which the at-
tacker would find indistinguishable from the real data residing on the HVA.
The network application (seen in Figure 1.3) that detects the malicious flow
would be able to programmatically deploy a specific VNF based upon the
attackers intended target.
SDN is used in this research to make use of the network controller’s ability
to have a holistic view of flows within the network [18, 19] and allowing for the
differentiation between critical and non critical paths within the EPC. SDN
also allows for a programmatic way in which to react to flows that request
to make use of non critical paths. A network application could therefore get
alerted to the malicious flow and then logically quarantine the compromised
node by redirecting flows towards decoy version of the intended target. NFV
is essential to this research as it allows for the automated configuration and
implementation of a decoy HVA on the network as a VNF only once an at-
tack has been detected.
In the worst case scenario, which involves an attacker having the foresight
to traverse only the critical paths to get to an HVA, this system would not
get triggered. This research still drastically lowers the paths that an attacker
would be able follow in order to target an HVA. This small set of paths could
then have higher levels of monitoring applied to them to detect malicious
behaviours.
1.1.1 Problem Definition
Research on securing a EPC has mainly been focussed on the perimeter de-
fences of the network, therefore, if an attacker successfully bypasses these de-
fenses they can achieve a foothold in the network. From the initial foothold,
the attacker could lay dormant within the EPC for large amounts of time,
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gathering up information at the same time [20]. The attacker would also be
able to spread to other nodes throughout the EPC as all lateral movements
throughout the EPC are deemed to be trusted. Attackers generally make
use of an island hopping attack once they have infiltrated a network, which
involves laterally moving between network nodes, beginning at their entry
point and moving towards an HVA [21]. MNOs would want security mea-
sures deployed that would alert them as timeously as possible to mitigate
any malicious activities being performed within their EPC.
As MNOs are advancing towards 5G, the mobile EPC is heading towards
being virtualised through the use of SDN and NFV techniques, this presents
a chance to leverage these paradigms in order to develop new techniques
for increasing security around the EPC entities. The specific security issue
covered is to reduce the number of paths that attackers would be able to
traverse while laterally moving between network entities within an EPC that
the attacker has compromised.
Security measures put in place must not hinder the overall functionality of
the EPC because that would lead to the measures never being implemented;
there must always be a balance between security and usability/functionality
of a system that is open to such large volumes of traffic.
Differentiating between flows over critical and non critical paths does not
keep attackers out but is able to limit and constrain lateral movement be-
tween the nodes of the EPC by only allowing for critical network pathways
to be followed.
EPC elements are designed to have quick responses to valid communica-
tions. If an attacker were to find themselves on a compromised node inside
the EPC, they would be able to exploit this open level of trust that entities
have within the EPC. The attacker would be able to mimic the expected
signals as the communication standards that the EPC entities rely on are
public knowledge.
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The network application needs to automatically contain the attack by de-
ploying a virtualised version of the intended target which the attacker would
then get redirected to. This is in order to convince the attacker they are
being successful in their attack while gathering intelligence on the attacker.
This work also needs to include a comprehensive literature review on
other research performed on the threats presented to the EPC. The liter-
ature review will need to detail how SDN and NFV have been utilised to
improve upon the security of other networks.
The primary goal of this research is the design and implementation of
a SDN based EPC that utilises a network application to detect malicious
network flows. These malicious flows are assumed to be instigated by an
attacker while attempting lateral movement within the EPC. This work will
include how the application will respond to a detected malicious behaviour
in order to mitigate the threat.
1.1.2 Research Questions
The main questions to be investigated by this research are as follows:
• Can the use of SDN and NFV on a mobile EPC lead to better security
for the critical EPC entities.
• Would a SDN based NIPS be able to warn MNOs of an attacker within
their EPC while also automatically quarantining the attacker to miti-
gate damages or data leaks.
• If strict flow rules are applied on an EPC such that only flows which
make use of critical network paths are allowed, would this hinder the
functionality of the EPC.
• Will an intruder be detected due to the irregularities of their actions
on the network.
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• Is a network application capable of detecting malicious activity in the
network and consequently reacting to this detection in order prevent
the attacker from causing damage to, effecting the functionality of, or
extracting data from the EPC.
• Would the automated quarantining of the compromised node alert the
attacker to their detection.
1.2 Scope and Limitations
The scope of this research is limited to the benefits of using SDN and NFV
techniques in order to secure an EPC from internal attacks. Other security
aspects pertaining to Long Term Evolution (LTE) and the EPC specifically
are out of scope and were only visited and discussed in the literature review.
The scope is further limited to defending from an attacker that has al-
ready achieved control over a node within the EPC. The attacker is presumed
to have full admin rights on the entry node (root privileges assuming a Unix
node).
The EPC is limited to being only made up of the essential entities, com-
prised of Home Subscriber Server (HSS), Packet Data Network Gateway (P-
GW), Serving Gateway (S-GW) and Mobility Management Entity (MME).
Other add on modules are not considered in this research.
The scope is also limited to the specific example of an attacker having
compromised an administration node (jump box) and is directly targeting
the HSS of the EPC.
1.3 The Dissertation Structure
The following sections summarise the content of each chapter of the disser-
tation as well as provide an overview of the dissertation.
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1.3.1 A Review of EPC Security as well as Techniques
Utilising SDN and NFV in Order to Secure Net-
works (Chapter 2)
This chapter provides a brief background on the EPC as well as an overview
of the current LTE EPC standard and the security architecture and attack
vectors associated with it. This chapter also reviews other research that
has been presented in terms of security functionalities that have been imple-
mented with the SDN and NFV paradigms.
1.3.2 Requirements and Design of NIPS for the EPC
(Chapter 3)
This chapter presents the requirements for the proposed NIPS, based on
typical patterns deployed by attackers within a network. The logic of the
SDN network application is designed including the programmatic steps that
will be followed. The overall architecture of the proposed solution is finally
decided upon at the end of this chapter.
1.3.3 Implementation of the Security Architecture (Chap-
ter 4)
This chapter presents the implementation of the EPC with our designed se-
curity architecture as well as how this system was deployed for evaluation
purposes. The methods by which internal attackers are detected and system-
atically responded to is presented.
1.3.4 Results and Analysis (Chapter 5)
This chapter presents the results of our implementation of an EPC that
utilises SDN control plane applications to control, detect and respond to
internal attackers by deploying virtualised versions of the attacks target.
The information gathered on the attacker is also presented and analysis is
performed as to how effectively the information can be acted upon.
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1.3.5 Conclusion (Chapter 6)
The dissertation is concluded in this chapter along with proposing future
work that can be performed in this area of research.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND AND
LITERATURE SURVEY
The previous section introduced the basic concepts and aims of this research,
including the security concerns around the EPC [22]. This section first gives
a brief background on the EPC architecture and then presents a more in
depth review of some of the most prevalent security concerns the EPC faces.
The previous section also introduced SDN and NFV technologies and how
their implementation in an EPC architecture can potentially be utilised to
mitigate a specific security concern of the EPC. The following section pro-
vides more background on those paradigms and also covers how research has
been performed using these technologies to improve network security.
2.1 Evolved Packet Core Architecture
The EPC is the technical name for the Core Network of the Third Genera-
tion Partnership Project’s (3GPP) Long Term Evolution (LTE) system. The
LTE system provides great improvements on both the Radio Access side as
well as the packet core side when compared to legacy mobile systems such as
2G, GSM and CDMA. The EPC allows for backwards compatibility to legacy
technologies allowing for a convergence of mobile networks [23]. 4G/LTE has
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been designed as an All-IP architecture and has replaced the hybrid Circuit
Switched (CS) and Packet Switched (PS) domain that was inherited from
2G/3G with a pure PS EPC.
Figure 2.1: Fundamental components that make up the 4G architecture
The overall 4G architecture in Figure 2.1 is separated into two parts.
Firstly, the Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN)
which focusses on the base station and radio access to the network, and
secondly the EPC which is comprised of several key components which are
broken down as follows:
• The Packet Data Network Gateway (P-GW) is the contact point of
the EPC to external networks such as the Internet or IP Multimedia
System (IMS). The P-GW also assigns User Equipment (UE) an IP[4].
• The Serving Gateway (S-GW), which behaves as an entry point for the
UE into the Core Network (CN) from the RAN, as well as gathering
information on sessions for billing purposes.
• The Home Subscriber Server (HSS) contains a database of all users’
subscription information and is responsible for determining what level
19
of QoS a user is allowed on the network. The HSS also performs au-
thentication and authorization of the user.
• The Mobility Management Entity (MME) is in charge of signal pro-
cessing between the EPC and the UE. The MME is responsible for
initially setting up the control of sessions by authenticating the user
with the HSS. Once a session is authenticated, the MME determines
which S-GW to anchor the UE to. The MME is also responsible for
detecting that a UE has changed coverage areas and therefore migrates
an existing session to a different S-GW.
2.1.1 Vulnerabilities and Security concerns in the EPC
Vulnerabilities within Mobile Networks (MN) can be defined as weaknesses
in any component present in the overall architecture of the system. These
weaknesses are then able to be exploited in order for an attack on the MN
to be conducted.
No research could be found that explicitly looks at defending an EPC
from an attack that has already successfully gained internal access to the
EPC. Research focus has been primarily on the perimeter defences of the
EPC, and effectively relying on the design of the EPC to keep it secure by
use of communication protocols between nodes that ensure Authentication,
Authorisation, and Accounting (AAA) such as the DIAMETER protocol [24].
This is an important gap in current research because once an attacker has
compromised a node within the EPC, and were given free reign to laterally
move throughout the network to HVAs, they would be able to perform any
of the following attacks [25, 26] :
• Intellectual property theft
• Information technology sabotage
• Unauthorised data extraction
• Corporate espionage
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• Data tampering
• Asset destruction
• Installing malicious software on other nodes.
• Resource misuse (eg. crytocurrency mining)
• Social engineering on MNO clients
• Fraud with MNOs customers banking details
• Spoofing
• Eavesdropping
Paolini et al states that the decision to transfer to a flat IP architecture
has caused a shift in mobile wireless entry points [27]. The transfer to an all
IP based network has opened up the mobile EPC to all the vulnerabilities
associated with other traditional IP networks such as the Internet [28].
Modern MNOs rely mostly on perimeter security mechanisms mostly
based on the understanding that the edges of the network are the most vul-
nerable to attacks stemming from external sources. The edge of MNs are
heavily protected with firewalls, IPSs, Network Address Translators (NATs)
and Customer Edge Switching (CES). The heavy focus on MN edge protec-
tion has led to the internal network being open to attacks on unaddressed
vulnerabilities [28].
The EPC makes use of the GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) to manage
mobility and QoS functionality [22]. Park et al. covered several security
issues stemming from the use of the GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) and
are presented as follows[29]:
• The work from Park et al. presents a scanning attack where an attacker
could use GTP echo messages to scan the layout and other information
relating to the targeted EPC. This info leak could then act as an initial
reconnaissance for later escalation of attacks
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• It is also shown in the work from Park et al. that a possible resource
exhaustion attack could be conducted to exhaust the resources of a
P-GW by sending through a flood of Create Session GTP messages.
• Create Session messages are shown to also be able to target individual
users on the MNO network by sending said create message with a fal-
sified number of a targeted user. This user would not be able to utilise
the mobile network.
• GTP fuzzing is shown to be able to interrupt the functionality of an
EPC entity. Fuzzing by means of malformed GTP packets could cause
systems to malfunction when receiving said packets. Fuzzing is shown
to be a legitimate attack due to the backwards compatibility of the 4G
EPC, essentially allowing for a downgrade attack.
The four elements of the EPC presented in 2.1 are critical to its func-
tionality. Attacks on, or compromisation of these entities could result in the
following:
• If the contents of an HSS were to be leaked then the authenticity,
integrity and confidentiality of all connections to the MNO would be
compromised.
• If either of the gateways (S-GW or P-GW) are compromised then the
attacker would be able to perform Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks
as well as rerouteing all traffic to illicit sources.
• If the MME were to be hindered then all users would be unable to
connect with new sessions to the network as well as not being able to
change coverage areas, rendering the entire system unusable.
2.1.2 Research into securing the EPC
Quang et al claims that once a component in the EPC gets compromised, the
attacker would be able to traverse through the network; their proposed mit-
igation is a DIAMETER based security framework [30]. DIAMETER is an
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Authorization, Authentication and Accounting (AAA) protocol that is used
within the EPC as an update of the RADIUS protocol, it offers enhance-
ments such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) compatibility and, because it
is TCP based as opposed to UDP based it is seen as being more reliable.
NEMESYS presents research into predicting abnormal behaviour from
mobile users by monitoring the control plane and billing data [31]. NEMESYS
also makes use of honeypots/decoys in their research although they simulate
UE as their honeypots in order to entice mobile malware to connect to them
such that analysis can be performed on the malware to further improve on
the detection capabilities of the NEMESYS system. NEMESYS is more tar-
geted at the security of the mobile devices that are connected to the mobile
network.
ASMONIA takes a thorough accounting of the threats and risks associ-
ated with mobile terminals and communication networks [32]. ASMONIA is
also targeted mostly at the security of the UE connected to the EPC. The
system analyses traffic going through the EPC for malicious patterns or sig-
natures such that further action can be taken.
2.2 Software-Defined Networking and Network
Functions Virtualisation
Two of the paradigms that MNOs are switching to and applying to the EPC
are Software Defined Networks (SDN) and Network Functions Virtualisation
(NFV). Both SDN and NFV are slated as being the next big changes in
the telecommunications industry due to them addressing the challenges that
have been most pertinent in next generation networks such as the 3GPP’s 5G
specification, and both are receiving extensive research in order to be applied
to the new 5G standard [15]. When SDN and NFV are utilised, networks
are able to become more agile and are able to transform the topology and
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functionality of the network in an automated fashion in order to scale on
demand [33, 34].
2.2.1 SDN architecture
Figure 2.2: SDN architecture
SDN allows for the separation of data and control planes. This allows
for a logically centralized controller that can then have a holistic view of the
network as each node reports with its state back to the controller [35]. SDN
allows for control functions to run as network applications within the logically
centralised controller. Another common term for SDN controller is the Net-
work Operating System (NOS). The controller provides network applications
with a global network view as well as a programmatic interface (Northbound
API) for manipulation of the network’s forwarding devices (Data Plane) [14].
This architecture of separation of control from data planes, allows for the
switches in a network to be simpler devices with limited logic built into them,
switches can be reduced to basic packet forwarding devices containing flow
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tables populated with flows specified by the controller. The flow rules de-
scribe how incoming packets get handled based on the matching fields (such
as packet header content, source/destination address/port, etc.). The key
enabler for this functionality is the OpenFlow (Southbound API) protocol
which allows for the controller to communicate with switches. With the
SDN controller being logically centralised, this allows for the controller to be
hosted on general purpose servers [36].
The full technical architectural background of SDN can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
2.2.2 NFV Background
NFV is the second of the new paradigms that MNOs are switching to and
applying to the EPC. NFV is a framework that allows for network functions
to be separated from proprietary hardware appliances and enables dynamic
methods to construct and manage network functions with virtualisation tech-
niques. Modern virtualisation platforms are able to be utilised as well as com-
mercial off the shelf hardware in order to deploy the functionalities required
for telecommunications networks [37]. A more detailed technical breakdown
of NFV can be found in Appendix B.
2.3 Use of SDN and NFV in security
SDN is able to enhance network security for two reasons, first is the central-
isation of the network control plane which allows for the global visibility of
the behaviour of network traffic as well as the holistic state of the network.
Second, is the programmability achievable on data forwarding elements that
comes as part of SDN. Together it is now possible to have instantaneous
threat mitigation and automated responses due to the runtime network mon-
itoring, as well as simplifying the configuration and adjustments of security
policies in one centralised location instead of individual device alterations
within the network [38].
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An SDN based network security system for defence against Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks was patented by Han et al., their system
involved an IDS that would sample network traffic and devise an action plan
as to how to react to the threat, this action plan would then get passed to
the network controller for analysis; the patent does not explicitly state what
actions the controller performs [39].
Using SDN to improve on the security of the EPC has been proposed
before by Kempf et al. [22]. Kempf et al. put forward a means to isolate
the mobile equipment once the terminal has been identified as being high
risk. It proposes rerouting all traffic from the infected terminal to a logically
separated network where malware gets removed from the device, only once
the terminal is deemed healthy is the terminal allowed back onto the EPC.
Their research does not cover the case for when the attacker has already
penetrated into the EPC.
”Detection as a service” (DaaS) presents a cloud based service that mon-
itors traffic through the gateways of an EPC. The service involves an IDS
that is deployed at the networks gateways and utilises the controller to block
detected malicious flows [40]. A similar approach is presented in this work
with the difference being that DaaS monitors the flows from the subscribers
of the MN, therefore leaving the flows throughout the internals of the EPC
unmonitored and allowing for internal attackers to traverse the network at
will. The work in this thesis ensures that internal flows are monitored.
Lin et al. researched modifying the SDN architecture with NFV in order
to deploy an IPS as a VNF in the data plane [41]. Their study mostly fo-
cussed on limiting the traffic overhead faced by the controller and the service
chaining problem. The service chaining problem being the technical difficul-
ties associated with how best to order network services (such as firewalls and
network address translation) when adding to a network system that already
is compromised of many different network services.
26
Virtual Network Security Functions (vNSF) are presented in work by
Battula et al., the vNSFs are utilised to ensure End to End (E2E) security
within a data centre [42]. The presented vNSFs include a Firewall (FW),
IPSec and an IPS which is utilised to perform Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)
and signature recognition.
A survey on the interfaces used by NFV security services is performed
in [43]. The survey covers security applications that require IPS, honeypots,
DPI, FW and Virtual Private Networks (VPN). The survey presents the re-
quired security applications within a MN include security requests from UE,
negotiation of security functions and security around the configuration of the
network, the latter is important to this research.
Monshizadeh et al. presents an analysis on the security concepts of the
Open Platform for NFV (OPNFV) and presents their findings as to how a
telecommunications as a service can be created that makes use of SDN and
NFV to allow for Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) to securely
share resources [44]. This work is more focussed on the general security con-
cerns that have arisen around the SDN and NFV paradigms themselves.
Software Defined Mobile Networks (SDMN) and the security aspects per-
taining to SDMNs are presented in works of Liyanage et al [38, 45]. SDMNs
are considered to be MNs that make use of cloud computing, NFV and SDN.
Liyanage et al. present a multi tiered approach to secure both the SDMN
subscribers as well as the network itself. The original work by Liyanage
et al. presents a technique to secure the communication channels within the
SDMN by leveraging on the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) and IPSec [45]. Re-
strictions to the back haul network are also installed by use of policy based
communication which in turn is shown to prevent source address spoofing
and DoS attacks. In a follow up paper, Liyanage et al. presents further re-
search into the security of SDMNs, with the introduction of Software Defined
Monitoring (SDM) to orchestrate the functionalities previously presented as
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well as a DPI technique to target specific malicious detected flows [38]. The
main takeaway from the research into SDMNs is the fact that it is possi-
ble to automate mitigation and reactionary procedures within a SDN and
NFV enabled network by setting up rules within the controller to provide
countermeasures and mitigation actions. Liyanage et al. also validates that
a combination of sources of information on an SDMN can lead to accurate
and rapid detection of attacks to the network [38]. This research lacks the
focus on protecting the individual EPC entities in the case of a compromised
element within the EPC.
2.4 Chapter Discussions
This chapter first presented an overview of the EPC architecture, as well as
presenting some of the security concerns raised on this architecture. Sec-
ondly SDN and NFV architectures were discussed with a focus on the ability
of applications within the control plane to mitigate malicious flows by mod-
ifying their flow destination. Evidence to support this was provided through
a thorough review of relevant literature within this research area. Many
current security solutions for MNs utilising SDN and NFV techniques focus
on the subscriber security and continue the pattern of focussing protection
for the EPC on the edges on the network. From the literature review it is
evident that the HVAs of the EPC have not been considered to be attacked
by compromised nodes within the same LAN segment, therefore allowing for
an attacker to traverse through the EPC without being detected.
The following chapter will present the requirements of an SDN based
system to protect the HVAs of an EPC, as well as providing the design of
the proposed solution.
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Chapter 3
Requirements and Design of
NIPS for the EPC
The previous section presented the existing work on using SDN and NFV
to improve on network security as well as highlighting the fact that cur-
rently there is not any research into securing the EPC from attacks that
have achieved a foothold in the internals of the EPC. No research was identi-
fied that secures the internals of the EPC. The main aim of this dissertation
is to provide a solution that will defend the EPC from attackers that have
already compromised a node within the network, this will be done by lever-
aging SDN and NFV techniques. This section will look at the requirements
of the proposed NIPS based on typical attacker behaviours. From this, the
algorithm used for the logic of the NIPS will be presented as well as the
architecture for the proposed system.
3.1 NIPS requirements
MNOs would never implement a security feature onto their EPC that compro-
mises the base functionality of their EPC. Therefore maintaining the overall
functionality of the EPC highly influences the design and requirements for
this research. SDN and NFV are beneficial to the specific problem of at-
tackers already compromising a node in the EPC because of SDN’s ability
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to monitor and orchestrate all of the traffic within a network without dimin-
ishing EPC performance, whereas NFV allows for specific and flexible VNFs
to be deployed to draw malicious users away from the EPC that will still be
running as intended.
3.1.1 General attacker patterns
The NIPS needs to be able to mitigate the typical patterns that are followed
by attackers. An attacker is what modern media portrays as a hacker. At-
tackers are users that have malicious intent with their target system. The
following section details some of the typical patterns followed by attackers in
order to justify the requirements for the NIPS and are based off the work in
[46].
Initially an attacker would compromise a node within the network by
exploiting a vulnerability within the network (a list of vulnerabilities asso-
ciated with an EPC is available in List 1.1). Once an attacker has achieved
a foot-hold in the EPC, they would then be ignorant to the topology of the
EPC. The attacker needs to become better informed about the layout of the
network. In order to do this, a reconnaissance attack would be performed.
This attack has multiple variances including mapping every reachable node
in the network from the compromised node (also known as the entry point).
This is facilitated in part by IP and DNS scanning techniques. The major
goals of an attackers reconnaissance attacks are two fold: [21]
First is to collect technical details about the systems corresponding to
each network node reachable from the entry point. This includes comparing
signatures for operating systems as well as their configuration. Traffic flows
from the compromised node are also sniffed to garner more information about
the network. This information can give the attacker a better idea of how to
compromise the other nodes in the network.
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Second goal is to map the network topology. This is usually achieved
by means of a graph search strategy of all nodes contactable from the entry
point. This can give the attacker a better understanding of how to traverse
the network towards their intended target/s.
Attackers could also get more details about other nodes in the network
by searching through the application configurations or logs of the entry node.
In this case the reconnaissance would not make any network calls. In this
situation the attacker would not need to perform a full network scan which
is beneficial to the attacker as full network scans are considered noisy and
attract attention.
Once the attacker has performed reconnaissance on the other nodes in
the network, the attacker would then be able to perform further attacks on
the other identified nodes within the network. Attackers would next target
HVAs which were identified, because the HVAs would provide the attacker
with the most prominent gain for all their previously expended effort and
being able to query or corrupt an HVA would be the attackers end goal.
Further attacks could come in the following forms:
• Undetected intrusion attacks such as modifying, monitoring or running
software implementations on any of the nodes [47].
• Data exfiltration from a HVA such as a main database (ie. HSS for the
case of the EPC).
• Bringing down the HVA by means of crippling its underlying infras-
tructure or flooding the HVA with malformed messages [48].
The best defence for any network would be to remove all vulnerabilities
from their networks therefore denying any attacker a starting point for the
overall attack playbook. But the total elimination of vulnerabilities from any
wide reaching system such as the EPC seems to be an ever lasting endeavour
and new vulnerabilities are constantly being identified by researchers [21].
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3.1.2 Requirements
Based on the typical behaviours exhibited by an attacker described above, we
can determine the following requirements for a NIPS that mitigates attacks
on the EPC:
• Minimise the paths that an attacker can traverse without being de-
tected, because comprehensive reconnaissance makes use of every net-
work path available to the compromised node. This minimisation of
legitimate network paths to traverse, increases the probability of an
attacker attempting to make use of a path that would trigger an alert
whenever attempting a lateral movement within the network.
• Ability to discern between network flows that make use of critical and
non critical network paths. This distinction will allow for automated
detection and responses whenever a non critical path is attempted to
be traversed. While also allowing for all legitimate flows that are ex-
perienced within a functioning EPC to continue functioning correctly.
• Detection of flows that are making use of non critical paths. An EPC
that is functioning as expected will never make use of a non critical
network path, therefore it is assumed that data attempting to flow
across a non critical path has malicious intent. MNO operatives need
to be alerted to this malicious activity within their EPC.
• Containment of the compromised node that instigated the detected ma-
licious flow. This will prevent the attacker from causing further harm
to the EPC while the MNO operatives are able to act on mitigating
the overall attack.
• Respond to the overall attack by alerting the MNO operatives as well
as quarantining the compromised node in an automated fashion.
• Do not tip off the attacker that their actions have triggered a warning,
effectively stalling the attacker such that the MNO operatives have
time to act accordingly.
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3.2 Design of SDN NIPS application algo-
rithm
The first design decision that needs to be made is how to ensure that our
NIPS does not interfere with the base functionality of an EPC. Given that
there are only a handful of critical network paths between entities in a typical
EPC set-up, it is entirely feasible to initially configure the NIPS system with
a white-list of allowed network paths that are critical to the EPC’s func-
tionality. Any data flows across those white-listed network paths will not be
affected by the proposed NIPS, therefore ensuring the functionality of the
EPC remains unaffected.
The second design decision was how to detect an attacker within the net-
work. Based on the white-list of allowed network paths an SDN application
could be written to determine whenever a network path is being requested
that is not within the white list of allowed network paths. Every network
request made within a network will be monitored by the logically centralised
controller utilising SDN, therefore logic can be implemented within the con-
trol plane that can distinguish between critical and non critical flows through-
out the EPC based on the pre-configured white list of network paths.
After an attack has been detected, it has been stated that the attack
should get contained. With the use of an SDN enabled network, flows can
get redirected, therefore once a node has been identified as the source of
a malicious network path request, the SDN application will be capable of
re-routing all future malicious requests from the compromised node away
from their intended targets. Only once the attacker instigates an attempt
at laterally moving to specific HVA does the decoy for the HVA get deployed.
The NIPS application needs to trigger a response to the attack. It was
determined that two parallel automated responses should take place once the
attack is detected. The first of these responses would be to send out an alert
to the MNO operatives that are responsible for the maintenance and overall
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operations of the EPC. The other response goes hand in hand with the con-
tainment steps above. Once the attack is detected a decoy VNF version of
the intended target should get deployed. The SDN application would then
be able to re-route all network flows that were originally aimed at the HVA
towards the decoy version. This would cause the attacker to think that they
have been successful in their attempt at lateral movement from their entry
point towards their targeted HVA. This would therefore delay the attacker,
as they attempt more malicious activities on the decoy, such that the alerted
MNO operatives can act further to stop the attack.
Figure 3.1: Flow diagram for the logic in the NIPS application
The overall logical decisions and processes of the SDN NIPS application
can be found in Figure 3.1 and Algorithm 1. Step 1 is triggered whenever a
switch in the network receives a flow request that it does not already have
a flow table entry for, the switch then contacts the controller with the flow
request which is processed by the controller and triggers off the NIPS func-
tionality.
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Algorithm 1 NIPS application
1: new flow request Fr made of controller
2: set Wl as the list of critical network paths
3: set P as the path required for flow (P← Fr.path)
4: if P is in Wl then
5: update switches with valid Fr
6: else
7: send alerts
8: HVAtype← Fr.destination.nodetype
9: deploy decoy D of type HVAtype
10: alter Fr by replacing the destination field with D’s address
11: update switches with mutated Fr‘
The flow request that is received at the controller will have all the prop-
erties of the requested flow such as the source and destination nodes of the
flow, which is the same as knowing the path that the flow will be making use
of. Configuration will also be managed such that the node type is known for
all nodes in the network.
The conditional logic (oracle function) in step 4 is to determine whether
the incoming flow request is malicious or not. Step 5 is a simple case that
allows the controller to process the requested flow as it is, this is for the non
malicious flow case which is what would be the most common occurrence
within a normally operating EPC. The overhead incurred to get to Step 5 is
kept at a minimal in order to prevent any extra latency within the regularly
functioning EPC.
Steps 7 though 11 cover the case of a flow request being identified as
malicious. In this case fast containment, alerting and response times are
essential. Therefore two parallel/asynchronous process streams will get trig-
gered. First is to send the alerts out to the MNO operatives, step 7 gets
executed in parallel with the steps 8 to 11. The other parallel stream in-
volves identifying what type of decoy to deploy based on the node type of
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the destination of the flow request (ie steps 8 and 9). The final steps (10 and
11) of this second stream is to alter the malicious flow request to change the
destination to the newly deployed decoy. This is done by altering the flow
request by replacing the original flow requests destination address field with
the destination address of the newly deployed decoy. The decoy is configured
to behave exactly the same as the HVA node that it is mimicking. The mu-
tated flow request is then processed by the controller therefore redirecting
the compromised node’s data flows to the decoy node. Thus ensuring that
all malicious traffic originating from the compromised node goes towards the
decoy and the EPC is able to continue functioning correctly. The delay be-
tween the start of step 8 to the end of step 11 needs to be short enough that
the attacker is not alerted to the processes, this time is subjective depending
on the geographic dispersion of the network elements as this affects response
times between network nodes without and NIPS triggering processes.
3.3 Functional Architecture of the NIPS
With the NIPS applications’ logical design described it is now possible to
discuss the entire systems architecture that is presented in Figure 3.2. The
system consists of three layers based on the SDN paradigm. The applications
layer, the controller layer and the data plan layer. The functions of each layer
will now be described in a top down approach.
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Figure 3.2: Functional architecture of proposed NIPS
The application layer consists of a white list of critical network paths. All
flow requests get their path checked against the white list by the malicious
flow oracle function. The alerting system that gets triggered in the case of a
malicious flow resides in the application layer. Determining the type of decoy
needed along with the functionality to deploy decoy nodes are contained in
the application level. A flow request mutator is also implemented at appli-
cation level.
The controller layer is preconfigured in a way that whenever a new flow
request is made of it, it does not process it straight away, it passes the flow
request onto the application layer. Only once the application layer replies
back with the flow request, does the controller process the flow request to
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install a flow rule onto the data forwarding devices.
The data layer consists of all the nodes within the EPC, along with the
switches that are used to connect the nodes together. The switches need
to be compatible with a protocol that allows them to communicate with the
controller. When a decoy node gets deployed it will reside in this layer as well.
The logical flow between the layers when reacting to an attacker is as
such: The compromised node attempts to connect to an HVA within the
EPC. The switch receives this network connection attempt but the switch
does not recognise the path that has been requested as it is not contained
in the switch’s current flow table. The switch makes use of the Southbound
API to make a flow request from the controller.
The controller receives the new flow request, which it is preconfigured to
pass onto the application layer via the Northbound API. The NIPS applica-
tion then checks whether the flow request is malicious or not, in the case of
a legitimate flow request then the application passes the flow request back
to the controller for processing.
In the case of the application determining that the flow request is mali-
cious, firstly the alerting system is triggered. While asynchronously a decoy
node gets deployed, once the decoy node has been provisioned, the flow re-
quest is altered to have the decoy as its destination. The mutated flow request
is then passed back to the controller for processing.
Both legitimate and mutated flow requests get processed at the controller
layer. The controller then replies back to the switch that instigated the flow
request with a flow rule that it should implement for the rest of the packets
in the instigating data flow.
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3.4 Chapter Discussions
This chapter presented the requirements, design and general architecture for
the proposed system. The requirements were decided upon based on the
need for the system to not be detrimental to the EPC functionality as well
as being able to mitigate typical patterns followed by attackers. From these
requirements a design for the logic of the NIPS application was presented.
Finally the overall architecture of the system was presented with a detailed
description of the interactions between separate logical functions.
The following chapter will establish how the Proof of Concept (PoC)
framework was created for this research system. Including a description of
creating and deploying the NIPS network application and illustrating how it
would effectively mitigate malicious users from laterally moving throughout
the EPC.
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Chapter 4
IMPLEMENTATION OF SDN
BASED NIPS FOR THE EPC
The previous chapter presented the requirements for a NIPS to prevent at-
tackers from laterally moving among entities in the EPC via non critical
paths. The overall algorithm for the NIPS application was also presented,
as well as a high level architecture detailing the interactions between the
logical functions necessary for this system. This section describes how the
proposed NIPS was implemented. A bottom up approach is followed based
on Figure 3.2 describing how each layer of the SDN architecture was imple-
mented as well as how the functions within those layers assist with the NIPS
application. Finally the configuration and setup of the system for testing
and evaluation purposes will be discussed.
4.1 Network Layer
Figure 3.2 shows the three components in the data plane, i.e., the EPC
entities, the OpenFlow enabled switches and the decoy EPC nodes. A closer
look at the specifics of the switches used in the network is presented first,
followed by the overall network setup to enable the EPC’s functionality.
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4.1.1 OpenFlow Switches
OpenFlow switches come in both software and hardware form. Software
switches were chosen for this research as they are more easily deployed while
still allowing for the same interactions with the controller and not hindering
any of the network application logic.
Open vSwitch (OVS) was the software switch selected because of its wide
adoption and documentation as well as support for multiple OpenFlow ver-
sions [49]. OpenFlow version 1.3 was adopted as the Southbound interface
between the switches and the SDN controller.
4.1.2 EPC Entities and Decoys
The OpenEPC is an implementation of the LTE EPC created by Core Net-
work Dynamics [50]. The OpenEPC project virtualised the EPC using NFV
techniques and allows for each EPC entity to be deployed as a single VNF.
There are two main approaches to the implementation of VNFs, first is to
have a dedicated VM for each specific VNF. The other way to implement
VNFs is to use containerisation, which creates a dedicated container for in-
dividual VNFs. A full technical description of the differences between VMs
and containers is presented in Appendix C.
The work presented by Fontenla et al. details how the OpenEPC was
reworked into individual containers for each VNF required for an EPC [51].
The four basic functional nodes of the EPC were each implemented as indi-
vidual containers i.e., HSS, MME, SGW and PGW. The container versions of
the EPC entities were shown in Table C.1 to be more efficient in terms of both
memory usage while running as well as storage of the VNFs. Therefore con-
tainerised VNFs were chosen due to their lower usage of computing resources.
In terms of the decoy VNFs to be deployed in the Network layer, contain-
ers have the advantage of being able to be spun up and be readily available
for usage a lot faster than VMs [52]. The chances of deceiving the attacker
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that their lateral movement was successful are improved the faster the decoy
can be deployed. This further cemented the choice to use the containerised
VNFs from the OpenEPC. This is due to the fact that the included overhead
would seem like typical network latency if the overhead is low enough. The
container approach combined both the S-GW and the P-GW into one con-
tainer which is referred to as the SPGW henceforth.
4.1.3 Network Environment
A network emulator was also required to run the SDN enabled EPC. Con-
tainernet, which is a mininet fork that allows for containers as hosts, was
decided upon [53]. Containernet is a programmatic network emulator that
allows for a number of virtual switches as well as virtual links between the
container hosts and the switches to be created within a single Linux VM.
Containernet is a network orchestrator that utilises a Python API to
programmatically define a network topology. OVS instances are used by
Containernet for the software switches. The network links between container
hosts and the switches are implemented using virtual Ethernet links. The
OVS elements are each able to connect directly to a separate network con-
troller. The Docker container platform is then used to deploy the container
hosts. Containernet was chosen due to the low barrier to entry to get a PoC
up and running as well as being a modern implementation of the popular
Mininet project. A full technical breakdown of Containernet is presented in
Appendix D.
A personal computer with 16 GB of RAM and a 3.2 GHz Intel i7 proces-
sor running an Ubuntu 18.04 Operating System (OS) was used as the base
platform to host the virtual machine resources required for the Containernet
environment. This was done to ensure that the NIPS and network envi-
ronment was never constrained by physical computational resources during
evaluation. The full architectural stack of the implementation can be seen in
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Figure 4.1. This system was designed and implemented to be generic so that
it could run any Unix based platform that has the Docker engine installed.
Figure 4.1: Architectural stack used to implement the network environment
4.2 SDN Controller
There are many different implementations of network controllers. A full
technical breakdown of the network controller is presented in Appendix A.3.
A comparison of three main network controllers considered can be found in
Table A.1. Based on the information obtained on the different choices of net-
work controllers, it was decided that RYU would be the network controller
utilised in this research because of its popularity in the research space and
its proven track record for quickly creating Proof of Concepts (PoC).
The Flow Request Processor and the Flow Rule Installer in Figure 3.2
are elements built into the functionality of the RYU controller. These func-
tionalities are leveraged via the RYU Python API.
4.3 Network Application
This section describes the functional elements utilised by the NIPS network
application in greater detail. All the logical units seen in the Applications
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layer of Figure 3.2 are presented in this section. The functions were imple-
mented in a Python script that was included as a new module for the RYU
controller. The full sequence of events that are handled by this application
can be found in Figure 4.2 and all steps referred to in the remainder of this
section refers to the the steps shown in this diagram.
Figure 4.2: Sequence diagram for legitimate flows (1-6) and malicious flows
(a-h)
4.3.1 Path White list
In the initial setup of the EPC network environment, all the OVS switches
will have no flow rules installed in their flow tables. In order for the EPC
to function correctly, the elements need to be able to communicate with one
another over network paths that are presented in the EPC’s technical defini-
tion (see Figure 2.1) [22]. Switches in an SDN environment are simplified and
limited to only having a flow table of known flows, in order to get the flow
rules installed in the switches, the switch needs to reach out to the controller
with the unknown flow request (Steps 1. and a.), the controller would then
44
process the request and reply with the appropriate flow rule (Steps 6. and h.).
The NIPS application will be affecting every flow request that is made
to the RYU controller via the OVS switches. Therefore it is essential for the
the NIPS application to know which flow requests should not get altered by
it or trigger alerts. In order to do this, a white list of the network paths that
are constantly being utilised by a functioning EPC needs to be created.
This white list of paths will need to be created and configured before
the launching of the NIPS application onto the system. The white list will
ensure that the EPC’s functionalities will not be affected when the NIPS
application is running. The white list was created based which EPC HVAs
need to communicate with one another
The white list was implemented as a TinyDB database which is a Python
database library that creates a JSON based file containing the input infor-
mation and allows for very fast and simple queries to be performed [54]. For
each network path there are two hosts addresses given as the path definition.
The path is reversible so therefore a path between HostA and HostB is the
same as the path between HostB and HostA.
4.3.2 Malicious Flow Oracle
Whenever an OVS switch in the system reaches out to the controller for a
flow rule, the controller needs to pass that flow request up to the Applications
layer so that the flow can be classified. In order to achieve that, a Python
function is written that is called every time an OpenFlow message with event
type EventOFPPacketIn is received by the RYU controller (Steps 2. and b.).
This function is what will be triggered every time a switch reaches out to the
controller with a flow request.
The classifying function is required to extract the network path from the
incoming flow request and then compare that path to the white list (Steps
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3. and c.). This is done by getting the source and destination values from
the flow request object. The output from the function needs to be a deter-
mination as to whether the flow is malicious or not. In order to determine
whether the flow is malicious, the white list database is queried as to whether
it contains the path extracted from the flow request. If the query returns a
false boolean value, then the flow can be deemed to be malicious (Step d.).
If the query returns a boolean value of true then the flow is not malicious
(Step 4.). In the case that the flow is not malicious then the system simply
allows the RYU controller to process the flow request as is (Steps 5. and 6.).
In the case of the flow being malicious, the Python application kicks off
two separate functionalities asynchronously (Both steps e.). They are de-
tailed in Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 below. The breakdown of the asynchronous
functionality of the network application is found in Section 4.3.5. In the case
of the case of malicious lateral movement from the compromised node to an
HVA across a white listed path then the NIPS functionality would not get
triggered.
4.3.3 Decoy process
First asynchronous function is to deploy the decoy node and reroute the
flow towards the decoy. This process has three separate logical functions as
detailed below
Decoy Type Identifier
The exact type of the EPC entity that is being targeted needs to be deter-
mined so that the correct type of decoy is deployed. The destination param-
eter from the flow request will give the address of the targeted node. From
that address the configuration of the network setup (described in Section 4.4)
is queried to get the type of the node associated with that address.
46
Decoy Deployer
Once the type of decoy required is known, the Python Docker library is used
to deploy the decoy [55]. This involves launching another, separate, container
from the same docker image as the target. The network address assigned to
this container is variablized and stored for usage in the next logical function
(Step f.).
Flow Request Mutator
The flow request object is then dynamically altered by changing the initial
destination address to the address of the freshly deployed decoy (Step g.).
Once the flow request has been mutated, the altered flow request is processed
by the RYU controller (Step h.), thus installing a flow rule on the network
switch that will cause all future data attempting to flow along that same
path to be redirected to the decoy.
4.3.4 Alerting process
The second asynchronous process that gets triggered when a flow request is
determined to be malicious is the sending of alerts to the corresponding MNO
operatives. Many channels exist to send the alerts; e.g., email or triggering a
digital operations management service specialising in incident response such
as PagerDuty. For simplicity sake alerts are sent as Instant Messages (IMs).
The chosen IM was Slack. Once the alert gets triggered the Python Slack
library is used to connect to the preconfigured slack server and send the alert
message to the relevant alerting channel [56].
4.3.5 Asynchronous Breakdown
Asynchronous programming involves a single processing thread that places
events into a queue and processes them sequentially based on specific event
handlers. Asynchronous processing also ensures that whenever one of the
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two processes experiences a long running step due to a required waiting pe-
riod for another system/function to reply, then that stream can be placed
into a deferred state that allows the other process stream to carry on be-
ing processed. Once the deferred stream returns back an expected result, it
immediately jumps back to the front of the event queue to be next in line
to be completed. This ensures that both functions get completed as quickly
as possible, which is essential because both functions covered by Sections
4.3.3 and 4.3.4 are required to be completed quickly. The processing times
experienced by the two asynchronous processes can be seen in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Processor time spent on the two asynchronous process streams
The waits in Figure 4.3 can be seen as moments in time when the pro-
cess stream changes. Wait 1 was determined to be caused by the container
deployment which can take up to a couple of seconds. While the docker
container is getting deployed the asynchronous system is able to then begin
processing the alerting process. The Decoy Process stream is set to being
deferred at this point.
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Wait 2 was experienced by connecting to the IM server used for alerting.
At this point the deferred Decoy Process stream has returned successful de-
ployment and this stream completes.
The connection to the IM server requires a full TCP connection be setup
over networks with slow Round Trip Times (RTT). This slow RTT is due to
the IM server’s being located in the USA while the client is in South Africa.
The Alert stream gets deferred while waiting for the server connection. When
the IM server is co-located with the EPC deployment then the RTT becomes
insignificant.
Wait 3 causes a process stream switch because the Decoy Process stream
has completed. At this point the Alerting Process stream has successfully
connected to the IM server and can therefore complete all the remaining
steps in this process stream.
4.4 Network Setup
A simple network topology was used for testing setup via Containernet, five
nodes are connected via one switch. Larger topologies with more switches
would not make any difference to the overall functionality of the PoC as each
OVS switch added would behave in the same way. The EPC nodes added to
the network are the basic nodes necessary for an EPC to function correctly.
They are the HSS, the MME, the SPGW and the bastion host that would
be considered the compromised node in the network. A virtual enodeB is
also included that will emulate typical traffic that is experienced by the EPC
[57]. The topology can be seen in Figure 4.4.
Docker allows for containers to communicate directly to one another
through a bridge/network that is setup internally in the Docker Engine. It
was decided to not use this way to connect the EPC containers and to rather
connect them via an OVS switch so that the EPC could be SDN enabled and
the switches could communicate with the SDN controller, which was essential
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for the NIPS application. This connection can be seen in Figure 4.4 as the
OpenFlow link.
Figure 4.4: Network topology set up in Containernet
A Python script was used to set up the network correctly. The script
ensured that the exact same network layout was created every time the net-
work was setup. This ensured that each host would get the same IP address
whenever the network was deployed as can be seen in Figure 4.4. The script
contained hard coded variables relating the EPC host entities and their cor-
responding network addresses that they would be deployed with.
The compromised bastion host was created as a basic Ubuntu:18.04 docker
container that had SSH and nmap capabilities. The compromised host only
needed to make simple network calls in order to test the NIPS PoC. The
nmap was included for the use case of network wide scanning to simulate a
network scan that an attacker may use to perform network reconnaissance
[58] as discussed in Section 4.5.3.
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4.5 Evaluation Techniques
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the NIPS PoC that was implemented,
first the EPC’s functionality was validated, then two different attacker pat-
terns were attempted. The first direct contact consists of a simple network
request originating from the compromised node towards a node along a non
critical path. The second would be for the compromised node to perform a
full network scan. The full technical details for how the NIPS application
was setup in order to evaluate it’s effectiveness is presented in Appendix E.
4.5.1 EPC validation
The network connections across critical network paths were first checked in
order to test the EPC’s functionality. If an EPC node could send an ICMP
ping to every other EPC node that it needs to communicate with with-
out triggering the NIPS functionality then the network connections between
nodes were deemed traversable. This test needs to be performed across every
single network path included in the white list. Basic tests of the interfaces
between the EPC elements need to be validated as well, for example the S6a
interface between MME and the HSS [23].
The enodeB emulator was included in the network topology in order to
emulate the typical traffic that an EPC receives from a RAN. This emulator
can simulate multiple Internet based requests that would be managed by
the virtual EPC setup in the test network. If this emulator is able to run
correctly without triggering the NIPS functionality on the PoC network then
the EPC can be considered to be functioning correctly.
4.5.2 Direct Network attack
This use case covers the scenario for the attacker knowing the exact network
address of their target node in the EPC; they may have found this address
inside logs or in a configuration file found on the compromised node. The
example covered for this use case would be for the compromised node to
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directly access the HSS node of the EPC. The NIPS application would be
setup in such a way as not to include that direct path in its white list.
The simplest test for this type of attack would be for a simple ICMP ping
to be sent to the IP address assigned to the HSS node from the compromised
node. This simple test will determine whether the NIPS application would
correctly get triggered due to the non critical network path getting requested
from the OVS device.
The other direct network attack simulation to be performed would be for
the compromised node to attempt to establish an SSH session with the HSS.
This test was expected to trigger the same functionality from the NIPS PoC
but more feedback would be given to the compromised node while interacting
with the attempted SSH connection. This was done in order to determine
how convincing the decoy can be.
4.5.3 Network scan
In the case of a node getting compromised and the attacker not knowing the
layout of the network, the attacker would need to perform reconnaissance
such as a full network scan. In order to do this, the compromised node was
preconfigured with the nmap utility and a full scan of the entire network
range was performed. This full network scan loops over the list of addresses
within the same ip address range as the compromised host. For each address
within that range, multiple requests are made of that address. If there is no
host responding from the current IP address then the host is either assumed
powered off or non reachable. The scan of each address returns all open ports
on any host that is reachable.
The scanning test will strain the NIPS application as it is expected to
involve deploying multiple decoys. Full network scans are known to take a
significant amount of time (minutes) as many address and ports are being
probed. This will allow for some leeway in terms of how much extra delay is
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incurred when the NIPS application reacts to the network scan by deploying
multiple decoys. With the white list set up in order to emulate the layout
presented in Figure 1.2 the only allowed path from the compromised node
would be to the MME. Therefore the scan should cause the NIPS to deploy
and reroute to a decoy of every other type of EPC node.
There are only a limited amount of entities that are included in the EPC
specification. Therefore the chances of a rogue node causing the NIPS to
experience a DoS are low as the system would only ever need to deploy as
one decoy per EPC entity. If the NIPS were applied to larger networks,
checks could be put in place to set an upper limit of decoys to deploy before
rather terminating connections from the rogue node all together.
4.6 Chapter Discussions
This chapter presented the implementation of the NIPS PoC including all
the elements at each of the three SDN layers. The network topology and en-
vironment needed in order to achieve the requirements for a successful PoC
were also presented. Finally the evaluation techniques were proposed that
would validate the effectiveness of the PoC while also ensuring that the PoC
implementation does not hinder the EPC’s functionality.
The following chapter will detail the results obtained when evaluating
the NIPS application PoC. The user journeys that will be experienced by
the attacker when triggering the NIPS as well as for the MNO operatives
when being alerted to the attackers’ actions will also be included.
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Chapter 5
Results and Discussion
The previous chapter detailed the implementation of the NIPS application
and the network environment required to validate the NIPS application. The
techniques that would be used to validate the effectiveness of the NIPS appli-
cation were also covered previously. This chapter provides the outcome of all
the evaluations as well as discussing how these outcomes give an indication
of the effectiveness of the NIPS application.
5.1 EPC Validation
To validate that the EPC was still functioning while interacting with the
NIPS application, first a basic ICMP ping was sent along every network
path that was included in the white list. This ensured that all the network
paths that were critical to the EPC’s functionality were still traversable with-
out triggering any of the NIPS application’s functionalities.
The Python script that was used to setup the Containernet topology
was also utilised to test all the critical pathways in the EPC. This involved
pings being sent from one host to another in both directions automatically
every time the network environment was deployed. Simple print statements
were added into the NIPS application that would give feedback whenever
the Malicious Flow Oracle function realised that the flow request was not
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malicious. Figure 5.1 shows the NIPS application output (Left terminal)
with the print statements. Also shown in Figure 5.1 is the critical path checks
being performed on the network environment (Right terminal) with the paths
being checked in the lines following ”*** Testing connectivity”. Note that
”flow is not malicious” was printed six times (Left) and six pathways were
tested (Right)
Figure 5.1: Critical paths being checked on the network environment deploy-
ment
Next the basic EPC functionalities needed to be tested, this was done by
viewing the running interactions between the EPC VNFs across the prede-
fined bearers. The first example of these can be seen in Figures 5.2, which
shows the SPGW’s initial setup to be able to handle the GPRS tunneling
protocol as well as the S11 interface being initialised for communication with
the MME. Figure 5.3 then shows the S6a bearer being successfully traversed
allowing for the MME (Purple lines) and HSS (Green lines) entities to inter-
act correctly.
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Figure 5.2: Combination of the SGW and PGW deploying as a singular
SPGW entity
Figure 5.3: MME and HSS interactions across the S6a bearer
The EPC’s overall functionality was also tested by connecting an enodeB
emulator that would simulate traffic through the network (refer to Figure
4.4). This test was done on a standard deployment of the EPC with a
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simple switch and again on the EPC deployment that was interacting with
the NIPS application. There was no difference found in the functionalities
of both these types of EPC deployments. The NIPS application was never
triggered during the test including the enodeB, concluding that the NIPS
application was functioning as expected during normal EPC functionalities.
5.2 Direct Attack
For the direct network attack to be verified, a non critical pathway needed
to be traversed. The path chosen for this test was the pathway between the
compromised node and the HSS node. This path was not included in the
white list used by the NIPS application.
Any type of network traffic between these two nodes would be triggering
the NIPS application’s functionality, therefore a simple ping request was sent
from the compromised node to the HSS node. Ping requests have the added
benefit of outputting the time taken for the ping to reach its destination and
return back to the source. The time taken for the pings to complete their
round trip (RTT) was therefore chosen as the metric to measure the success
of the NIPS application against a direct attack because attackers would no-
tice large delays incurred in their network requests when attempting lateral
movement.
Figure 5.4 shows both the output from the NIPS application (Left Termi-
nal) as well as the user journey experienced by the attacker when attempting
to ping the HSS from the compromised node (Right terminal). The left
terminal illustrates that once a malicious flow is detected by the NIPS ap-
plication, the alerting system and the decoy deployment are carried out as
well as redirecting the flow towards the decoy. The right terminal shows that
the attacker would not receive any errors when attempting to reach the HSS
directly, and the ping request is completed successfully.
In this case illustrated in Figure 5.4 only a single ping was sent. This
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shows that the very first request sent along the non critical path takes on
average 2.8 seconds which is made longer due to the overhead added to the
controller’s processing time by the NIPS application’s functionalities. This
overhead is only ever experienced on the first traversal of that non critical
network path. Subsequent pings returned with an average time of 50ms be-
cause the switch already has the correct flow rule installed in its flow table
and does not need to reach out to the controller. Initial pings across non-
malicious flows were also analysed and were found to have an average time
of 1.4 seconds. This overhead is due to the overhead of the switch reaching
out to the controller.
Figure 5.4: Direct network attack being simulated from compromised node
to HSS
The IM based alerting can be seen in Figure 5.5. Note that only singular
messages were sent whenever malicious flows were detected, therefore pre-
venting the channel getting flooded. This single message is due to the fact
that only the initial packet in a malicious flow triggers the NIPS application
and all subsequent packets flow freely through the switch to the decoy as
discussed above.
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Figure 5.5: Alert messages as viewed in the Slack IM client application
To further evaluate the NIPS application’s validity against a direct at-
tack, an SSH session was attempted from the compromised node to the HSS.
Figure 5.6 details the output that would be experienced by the attacker when
attempting to SSH across a non critical path. SSH server is not running on
any of the nodes other than the decoy that gets deployed therefore the only
host that could be responding to the SSH connection correctly is the decoy.
This shows that the compromised node attempted to SSH onto the HSS (by
using the ip address of the HSS), the NIPS was triggered and redirected the
flow to the decoy and now all further network interactions by the compro-
mised node would be acting on the decoy node including the remainder of
the SSH session. The last line in Figure 5.6 shows the name of the host that
was accessed as being the decoy.
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Figure 5.6: Compromised node initiating a SSH session attempting to access
the HSS and being rerouted to the decoy
5.3 Network Reconnaissance Attack
The last test for the NIPS application’s evaluation was for the attacker to
perform a network map from the compromised node. Figure 5.7 shows the
output experienced by the attacker (Right terminal) as well as the output
from the NIPS application (Left terminal) when the Nmap service is used to
map the network from the compromised node.
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Figure 5.7: Nmap scan being performed
When the compromised node performs the network scan, it triggers two
separate decoys to get deployed as can be seen in the left terminal of Figure
5.7. The two decoys that get deployed are the HSS decoy and the SPGW
decoy, because there is no critical path between the compromised node and
these two entities. No MME decoy gets deployed because the path between
the compromised node and the MME was added to the white list of critical
paths.
The attacker would see the output generated in the right terminal which
appears to be a successful nmap scan detailing the five nodes available in
the current EPC network. After the network scan was performed, when the
compromised node attempts to contact the HSS or the SPGW directly, those
network flows would get redirected to the decoys.
5.4 Chapter Discussions
This chapter presented the validation of the effectiveness of the NIPS appli-
cation first in terms of determining that the EPC still functioned correctly
when interacting with the NIPS. Secondly it detailed the effectiveness of the
NIPS application against two separate types of attacks that can be performed
from a compromised node inside the EPC.
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The EPC was validated first by proving that all the paths that are critical
to the EPC’s functionalities were traversable by simple ICMP ping packets.
This was done across all the paths that were added to the NIPS application’s
white list of critical paths.
Next the specific interactions between the EPC entities were shown to be
functioning correctly. This was shown both during initialisation of the EPC
as well as during normal operational loads expected by the EPC by means
of an enodeB emulator.
The first attack type that the NIPS was tested against was the direct
attack where the compromised node was attempting to directly contact the
HSS of the EPC. This network path was explicitly excluded from the NIPS
application’s white list. The RTT for the pings was used as a metric to mea-
sure how quickly the NIPS application could react to the detected malicious
flow. It was observed that the first ping would take on average 2.8 seconds
due to the fact that the NIPS application needed to deploy the decoy first
before altering the flow request. This initial delay could cause suspicion to
be raised by the attacker. All subsequent pings were seen to take an average
of 50ms therefore illustrating that the switch did not need to reach out to
the controller again and the compromised node was having its network traffic
redirected to the decoy node.
The SSH example showed that the attacker would experience a typical
user journey when attempting to SSH onto the HSS from the compromised
node whereas in actual fact they are SSH’ing onto the decoy.
The second attack type used to verify the NIPS’s effectiveness was the
network scan. It was shown that when the compromised node performs the
scan, decoys get deployed of the entities which the compromised node should
not be able to contact. The attacker will see their network scan complete
successfully on the whole EPC network but they would not have been able to
scan the HSS or the SPGW and are only interacting with the decoy versions
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of those entities.
The next chapter will present the conclusion as well as recommendations
for future work.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and
Recommendations
The previous chapters presented the background, design, implementation
and the verification of the NIPS for the EPC. This chapter summarizes the
research, presents recommendations for future work and concludes this work.
6.1 Summary
The EPC is a fundamental component to MNOs, therefore it is important
that the proposed system does not affect the EPC’s functionalities. A thor-
ough background was presented that detailed the architecture of a basic EPC
and its functionalities. This was done in order to gain a better understanding
of the network interactions between the EPC entities. From this understand-
ing came the ability to discern between critical and non critical paths within
an EPC setup. A literature review was presented that detailed the usage
of the SDN and NFV paradigms in other research relating to the EPC and
network security. They were shown to have been used for similar use cases
but never for the exact case of preventing an attacker from moving laterally
throughout the EPC.
The requirements for the NIPS application were detailed in Chapter 3.
64
These requirements described how the NIPS application should not inter-
fere with the EPC’s functionalities while still being able to detect, contain
and respond to attackers attempting lateral movement within the EPC. The
design of the NIPS application was also presented including a view of the
functional elements that were required as viewed from a SDN architecture
stand point.
Chapter 4 presented how the NIPS application was implemented. The
functions implemented for each layer of the SDN architecture were described
in high levels of technical details. This chapter also detailed the technical
steps required to create a network environment suitable for testing of the
NIPS application. The techniques that would be used to validate the effec-
tiveness of the NIPS application were described including methods to validate
the EPC as well as describing two types of attacks that would be conducted.
Finally, Chapter 5 presented the outcomes of the evaluation techniques.
This chapter showed that the EPC functions as designed while having the
NIPS application interacting with its network. The NIPS application was
also shown to successfully detect both types of attacks while automatically
triggering responses to the detected attack by containing the attack and
alerting MNO operatives.
6.2 Recommendations
This dissertation presented a NIPS application that made use of SDN and
NFV techniques to protect the EPC from attackers that had compromised a
node within the mobile Core Network. The NIPS’s functionalities could be
added to in multiple ways to give more helpful feedback and be more decep-
tive when dealing with attackers. More extensive evaluation techniques for
the NIPS are also worth exploring.
The first recommendation would be to improve the 2.8 second average
time taken for the first ping in the direct attack. This delay is noticeable
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when attempting a direct attack and could tip the attacker off that their
actions have triggered an automated alarm system. The delay was found to
mostly be cause by the deployment of the decoy. The flow rule could not
be mutated and installed onto the switch before the decoy had successfully
been deployed, if it was installed before the deployment completed, the pings
would be unsuccessful as they would be directed to a host that does not yet
have networking services running. Therefore the decoy deployment became
a blocking process.
There are two ways that this blocking process could be improved. The
first would be to deploy a more light weight decoy. A very basic container
that has minimal overhead and only pretends to be a fully functioning EPC
entity by listening on the correct ports would get deployed much quicker
therefore lowering the delay incurred in the first ping of a direct attack.
The second way to completely remove the blocking process would be to
have the decoys constantly being deployed. This option has the down side
that most of the time these decoy containers would be utilising computing
resources while not performing any function for the MNOs. The benefit of
this approach is that as soon as a malicious flow is detected the flow can get
redirected to the decoy without any need for the blocking process of deploy-
ing the decoy. This method would practically eliminate the 2.8 second delay
experienced by the first ping of the direct attack evaluation.
A further recommendation would be for the IM alerting messages to be
more informative about which node instigated the malicious flow, therefore
pointing the MNO operatives to the compromised node. This information is
obtainable from the flow request that is available to the NIPS application.
It was noticed that when the network scan was performed, multiple alert
messages were sent that could be customised to mention the target of the
attacks. This would also give the MNO operatives information about their
attacker as they could discern whether the attacker was mapping their net-
work or actively trying to directly contact a HVA of the EPC.
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In order to be more deceptive, the host names of the decoys should be
changed to be more specific to the type of node they are decoying as. This
would prevent the attacker from seeing ”root@decoy” such as the last line of
Figure 5.6.
The NIPS application could be run in unison with another system that
can more closely monitor the traffic along critical network paths. This could
involve some form of DPI on the critical paths that would be able to verify
that only legitimate EPC generated traffic is traversing the critical paths.
This would make lateral movement of any kind highly difficult for attackers
of the EPC.
When the NIPS is applied to an EPC the risk of DoS is very low. If the
NIPS were to be applied to other larger networks, then an upper limit needs
to be created for decoys per malicious node in order to prevent a DoS of the
NIPS.
A Network Address Translation rule could be applied to return packets
from the decoy node such that the return packets seen by the compromised
node would be seen as the targeted HVA’s address.
The final recommendation would be for the NIPS application to be ap-
plied to a fully fledged EPC that has all the entities integrated that an
MNO would have, this would include Authentication, Authorization, and
Accounting (AAA), Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF), Policy
and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF), and all other EPC entities
used to support legacy systems. As more of these entities are added to the
EPC, the amount of non critical paths grow at an exponential rate. As the
percentage of non critical to critical network paths grows larger, so too does
the probability of the attacker making a false step and triggering the NIPS.
A network map attack performed on a fully fledged EPC would be a great
stress test for the NIPS application as a large amount of decoys would have
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to be deployed as well as having to reroute many flows.
6.3 Conclusion
In this dissertation, a NIPS for the EPC that leverages off the SDN and
NFV paradigms is presented. It was shown that research had been focussed
on defending the perimeter of the EPC from attackers and that no research
had been performed on defenses that would detect, contain and respond to
attackers that had bypassed the perimeter defenses and managed to compro-
mise a node within the EPC.
This research shows that by setting up a system that only allows for
critical network paths between the entities of the EPC to be traversed, it is
possible to create a proactive defence against would be attackers of the EPC,
as opposed to a reactive one. The SDN paradigm allows for network appli-
cations to have a global network view, as well as a programmatic interface to
allow direct control of the network’s forwarding devices. This allows for the
NIPS application to monitor the state of the network controller for malicious
flows. Once malicious flows are detected, automated alerting can be sent
out while asynchronously containing the compromised node by rerouting its
malicious flows to a decoy that was deployed using NFV techniques. As far
as the author is aware, this is the first implementation of an SDN and NFV
based NIPS for the EPC that prevents attackers from moving laterally be-
tween entities.
The NIPS was shown to not hinder the functionalities of the EPC that it
was protecting while still being able to effectively prevent both direct attacks
and network reconnaissance attacks.
Therefore, this dissertation has shown that the NIPS application is a valid
means of defending the EPC from attackers that compromised a node within
the EPC, while still allowing the EPC to function correctly.
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Appendix A
SDN architectural breakdown
Figure A.1 shows the three main layers of the SDN architecture as well as
the interfaces between each layer. The following appendix describes each
element from a top down perspective.
Figure A.1: SDN architecture
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A.1 Network Applications
The network applications contain the overarching business goals and policies
that are required of the network, and determine the forwarding state that
should be applied to the forwarding elements of the network. Common goals
of the network applications are isolation, routing, security, load balancing
and traffic engineering [79]. Many NOS distributions contain built in ap-
plications that deal with common network functionalities. Applications are
preferably built in a micro-service fashion where each application has one
specific function, this modularity allows for the applications to be reused in
different combinations[103].
Most popular NOSes are open source, therefore allowing users to make
alterations to the internal functionalities of the controller to fit specific needs.
This allows for applications to be developed at a faster rate by the users of
the systems when compared to having specific vendors acting as a bottle neck
in terms of innovation.
A.2 Northbound API
The northbound API is the interface between NOS and the network appli-
cations. Through the northbound API the network applications are able to
install the flow rules they deem necessary via the abstraction and function-
alities provided by the NOS. The northbound API is also necessary to get
notifications to the applications when the state of the network has been up-
dated.
Current controllers have at least two different types of northbound APIs.
The first is an internal programmatic interface which is controller specific.
Applications making use of this interface need to be written in the same lan-
guage as the controller and essentially act as add on modules to the NOS.
This interface allows for the applications to read network state and be up-
dated with topology changes to the network as soon as the controller makes
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the changes. This approach is useful as the applications can then interact
with the controller with all the methods built into the programming language
as well as allowing for applications to have real-time updates of new infor-
mation available to the controller.
The second type of Northbound API interface that controllers provide
is a REpresentational State Transfer (REST) API. REST is a common web
development architectural style that makes use of the HyperText Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) in order for client and server to communicate. Current
controllers have similar REST interfaces therefore applications can be cre-
ated to run across a vast array of controllers without needing to be ported
to individual controllers. The downside of the REST API is the fact that
the applications would constantly need to be polling the NOS for updates
to the network state as the NOS does not allow for REST applications to
subscribe to updates on network state changes. This can lead to a significant
delay before the application can act on updates as well as wastefully utilising
processing overhead while the applications constantly poll for updates.
A.3 SDN controller
The NOS or network controller abstracts the complexities of the network
management away from applications in a similar way to how a computer op-
erating system abstracts the hardware interface complexities from computer
applications [102]. The primary purpose of the NOS is to abstract away the
specifics of controlling individual network devices as well as providing essen-
tial services and functionalities to the network. Examples of these services
and functionalities include installing forwarding rules on the data forwarding
elements, network state and topology monitoring, distributing configuration
adjustments to the network and device discovery.
The NOS is critical to the SDN architecture and the NOS selected for the
network must accommodate all the requirements of the network. As there
are different types of networks that may require a NOS, there have been
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many different types of NOSes developed with a wide range of performance
characteristics, architectures and built in services and functionalities. When
selecting which NOS to use for a network the following need to be taken into
consideration:
• Supported Northbound API
• Supported Southbound API (OpenFlow version)
• Architecture
• Modularity
• Industry partners
• Existing Network Applications
• Built in feature set
• Documentation
• Intended Application Domain
• Centralised or Distributed
Table A.1: Feature comparison of three popular Network Operating Systems
Northbound
APIs
Southbound
APIs
Base
architecture
Modularity
Intended
Application
Centralised or
Distributed
ODL REST API
OF 1.0, 1.3 and 1.4
SNMP, BGP/LS,
PCEP, LISP,
NETCONF/YANG
Java High Data Centre Distributed
ONOS REST API
OF 1.0 and 1.3,
NETCONF
Java High
WAN and
Carrier networks
Distributed
RYU REST API
OF 1.0, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4,
NETCONF,
OFCONFIG
Python Moderate
Research and
Campus networks
Centralised
There are three notable NOSes to mention, first is Opendaylight (ODL)
which is designed for the data-centre. Next is ONOS which was originally
designed for use in carrier networks. RYU is the third NOS and is highly
relevant to this work as it is primarily used in research and development
purposes [103]. The targeted networks for each of the NOSes highly affects
the architecture of the controller as well as the available network applications.
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A.4 Southbound API
The Southbound interface connects the NOS and data forwarding elements
(switches). Through the southbound API, the NOS is able to gather a global
network view from the switches, collect statistics on traffic and install for-
warding rules onto the switches. OpenFlow, ForCES and NetConf are all
different southbound APIs that can be supported by NOSes. OpenFlow is
the most commonly used southbound API although most controllers can sup-
port more than one southbound API.
OpenFlow is a protocol that provides abstraction for a forwarding pipeline
by providing a standard and open interface for the communication between
NOS and data forwarding elements. OpenFlow is an open source protocol so
it is highly modular and configurable to cater for specific requirements. This
design is a deviation from the previously vendor specific network languages
that switches communicated with, therefore ushering in the ability for active
open-source development within the field.
The standardisation and open source nature of the OpenFlow protocol is
particularly useful to network operators as vendor lock in is a non factor. If
the switch is able to communicate using OpenFlow then it can be substituted
by another switch that has the OpenFlow protocol included in its design, no
matter which vendor or open source project developed it [79].
A.5 Data Forwarding Elements
The lowest level of the SDN architecture are the data forwarding elements, or
switches. These elements are responsible for forwarding traffic through the
network based on their forwarding tables installed by the NOS. The switches
also collect statistics from the network and relay these back to the controller.
The switches are able to communicate via protocols such as OpenFlow dis-
cussed above. OpenFlow 1.3 is most implemented version of the protocol [97]
and even though later versions have been released, 1.3 is still has the highest
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support amongst vendors [103].
OpenFlow 1.3 switches contain one or more flow tables [79], when a packet
is received by the switch the packet gets processed by a data processing
pipeline against the entries in the flow tables. The flow tables contain multi-
ple flow entries, each flow entry consists of traffic statistics, packet matching
rules and actions to apply to the matching packets. Actions that can be
specified to be applied to packets include forwarding, dropping or modifying.
Packets can be forwarded to a flow table, a port or to the controller in the
case the the flow is not found in the flow table. The ability to modify flows
as well as sending the packets onto the controller are of particular interest to
this research as malicious flows would be unknown in the typical use case of
the network. Once the controller and applications have decided on an action
to take the flow would could be modified to a different node as opposed to
the initial target of the malicious flow.
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Appendix B
NFV Breakdown
NFV introduces the ability to automatically deploy network functions [37].
With NFV, all EPC components are able to be virtualised as specific Virtual
Network Functions (VNFs). This has come from the need to scale networks
without relying on proprietary hardware which is a cumbersome and expen-
sive exercise. Some of the main benefits of the NFV architecture are as
follows:
• Ease of management of network functions during their full life cycle
• Ability to deploy functions automatically and scale existing functions
up. Both horizontal and vertical scaling.
• Reducing energy consumption
• Lowering the Capital expenditure (CAPEX) by moving functionality
from dedicated hardware boxes into virtual resources (ie containers or
virtual machines)
• Lowering Operating Expenditures by not needing specialist staff or re-
lying on the vendor of the middle-box for maintenance or configuration
changes on network functions.
• Cost efficient and quick deployment of network functions.
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Appendix C
VMs vs Containers
Linux based containers have been around for more than 20 years, but it has
only been since the introduction of Docker in 2013 that container based vir-
tualisation has taken off in the world of computer sciences. VMs allow for the
creation of fully virtualised environments including separate kernels per in-
stance. Whereas containers are seen as more lightweight, with each instance
utilising the host machine’s kernel and libraries [96]. The container approach
is shown to utilise resources more efficiently due to the lower overhead costs
per instance deployment [74, 75]. These differences are detailed in Figure
C.1 below specifically for the Docker containerisation platform.
Table C.1 details the quantitative differences between container and VM
based implementations of the OpenEPC [94]. The averages were calculated
on the four specific logical nodes of the OpenEPC that are required for basic
functionality to be achieved i.e., HSS, MME, SGW and PGW. The average
deploy times were measured when deploying individual instances on the test
bed.
Table C.1: Comparison of Container vs VM implementations of the
OpenEPC
VNF deployment method Average Image Size (MB) Average Memory Usage (MB) Average Time to Deploy (seconds)
Virtual Machine 1352 3.68 16
Container (Docker) 368 0.975 3
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Figure C.1: VM vs Docker container architecture
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Appendix D
Containernet Breakdown
Containernet is an open source extension of the popular Mininet project.
The Mininet base provides a system that is able to emulate a network using
lightweight process-based virtualisation to deploy virtual switches, virtual
Ethernet links and virtual hosts within a single Linux VM [95]. Contain-
ernet extends this functionality with the ability to deploy containers as the
hosts within the emulated network, while still being backwards compatible
with Mininet and maintaining the same design goals of achieving a platform
that is able to scalably, flexibly and realistically deploy a network on a de-
velopers laptop.
Figure D.1 shows the architecture of Containernet. The sequence of steps
followed to get a network up inside the emulator as well as being able to inter-
act with all parts of the network are as follows. First the developer defines
the network topology, for this a python script was written that calls the
Containernet python API (1). As part of this network definition script, the
virtual switches can be configured to communicate with a remote controller
that is running as process separate from Containernet (2). VNFs and vir-
tual switches are then deployed in the Mininet-based emulation environment
including virtual Ethernet links to connect the network nodes together to
one another (3). Once the VNFs, vSwitches and virtual links are deployed,
developers can then interact with all parts of the network via Containernet’s
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interactive CLI, this can allow developers to carry out any process on any of
the hosts, whether they are Docker containers or virtual hosts (4).
Figure D.1: Containernet architecture with remote SDN controller
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Appendix E
Technical Description of NIPS
Setup and Evaluation
In order to get to the state where the NIPS application can be evaluated,
the following technical steps needed to be followed to get the network envi-
ronment setup correctly. All the following steps were run in individual bash
terminals on the base Ubuntu 18.04 OS.
The first step was to run the NIPS application as a extra module to the
RYU controller. This was done by using the Python package installer (pip)
to install the RYU controller and run the NIPS application module using
the newly installed ’ryu-manager’ to run the python script that contains the
NIPS application. This running NIPS application extension of the RYU con-
troller can be seen in Figure E.1. When the application is being run, the
RYU controller is listening on port 6633 for OpenFlow communications.
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Figure E.1: RYU manager running the NIPS application as a module exten-
sion for the RYU controller
Next step was to get the Containernet emulation environment up with
the correct topology. Containernet was installed using the instructions on
the Github page found in [101]. That installation ensures that all the correct
Python libraries are included for Containernet to run correctly. A script can
now be run that details the topology of the network using the Python pro-
cess as can be seen in Figure E.2. The script being run creates a topology
as seen in Figure 4.4 with the OVS instance connecting to the RYU con-
troller deployed in the first step above. This script also performs all the path
checks along the critical paths needed for the EPC to be functioning correctly.
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Figure E.2: Containernet setting up the network topology used for evaluation
The containerised OpenEPC needed to be run in the Containernet envi-
ronment. In order to get all the Docker images setup correctly to deploy all
the container VNFs, the Github page found in [99] details how to obtain all
the OpenEPC container VNFs. The enodeB emulator was found on a sepa-
rate repository by the same author [100]. Once all these images were loaded,
they were deployed in Containernet as can be seen in the lines following ”***
Adding docker containers” in Figure E.2.
The Containernet CLI was used from this point onwards to validate the
NIPS application. This interaction with the hosts/containers in the Contain-
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ernet environment can be seen is Figure 5.4.
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